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Executive Summary 
The Alaska Permanent Fund is a sovereign wealth fund of the state of Alaska established in 1976 
by a vote of the people to preserve part of the revenues from current oil production for future 
generations.  Twenty percent of direct petroleum revenues have been deposited into the fund 
which now has a balance of $32 billion.  Over its life it has generated nominal earnings of $35 billion.  
The successes of the fun in saving a share of the Alaska petroleum windfall and generating income 
are due to several factors.  The boom-bust economic history of the state has been a reminder of 
the need to actively manage public resources.  Fund management is independent of general 
government finances and extremely transparent.  It invests to maximize long run income.    
In addition, the modest share of petroleum revenues set aside in the fund has left enough 
available for the state to expand public spending, including the establishment of a number of 
programs designed to strengthen the economy in recognition of the non sustainability of the 
petroleum sector.  Since these public programs benefit particular segments of the population, the 
Alaska Permanent Fund dividend program was created in 1982 to provide an annual unconditional 
direct cash distribution to all Alaska residents.  The dividend was felt to be the most equitable way 
to distribute a share of the public wealth of the state to the entire population. 
Since the inception of the program, the dividend has been paid each year.  About half of 
Permanent Fund earnings have been allocated to the dividend program and the rest to increasing 
the balance in the fund.  The size of the dividend has increased as the fund has grown, but it 
fluctuates considerably because fund earnings change from year to year.  In 2010 the dividend 
payment was $1,281 which augmented per capita income by 3 percent.  
The dividend program has become extremely popular since most Alaskans feel that individuals 
can benefit more from deciding themselves how to spend at least a portion of the public wealth 
rather than allowing the government to decide on their behalf.  However a minority of the 
population feels the dividend fosters an attitude of consumerism and leads to underinvestment.  
And although the dividend has created a strong constituency defending the Alaska Permanent 
Fund, which many feel is the main reason for the success of the fund, there is concern that the 
dividend will prevent the fund from being used for its ultimate purpose which is to help support the 
economy after petroleum production ends. 
Beyond its obvious positive impact on aggregate income, employment and population,  little 
analysis has been done of other economic, social, and political effects of the dividend program.  
Because the dividend is not viewed as a policy to improve social welfare, but rather as a means to 
share public wealth equitably, interest in these other potential effects has been limited. 
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1. Introduction: Some Background on Alaska 
Alaska is the largest of the 50 United States measured by land area—but its 700 thousand 
residents make it one of the smallest in population.  Its border is open to the rest of the nation for the 
free movement of goods and services, people, capital, and information. Furthermore, it is subject to 
the laws, regulations, and policies established by the federal government. 
Because of its small population, Northern location astride the Arctic Circle, and distance from 
markets, Alaska’s economic development prospects are limited primarily to exploitation of its 
natural resources and federal spending.  Most of its economic growth since becoming a state in 
1959 has come from petroleum production which alone accounts for one-third of all jobs, directly 
and indirectly. 
The economic history of Alaska prior to statehood was one of periodic resource driven booms--
furs, gold, copper, timber, and fish—followed by busts due to resource depletion or market 
conditions.  Each boom generated substantial economic rents,  but most went to nonresidents who 
left behind little for the benefit of the permanent residents.  Many residents felt the policies of the 
federal government were stifling growth and advocated for greater local control. 
When Alaska became a state, the state government took title to about 24 percent of the land, 
and adopted a constitution specifically requiring management of public resources for the 
maximum benefit of its people.  The idea of Alaska as the “Owner State” where the wealth from 
natural resources formed the economic base and was shared by all residents was promoted by 
one of the early governors, Wally Hickel. 
 The economy of the new state was initially weak, but in 1968 the largest oil field in North 
America was discovered on state land at Prudhoe Bay on Alaska’s North Slope. In 1977 production 
began and since then the state economy has been dominated by petroleum production and the 
state revenues it has generated. 
The direct contribution of North Slope petroleum production to gross state product has varied 
between 9 and 50 percent (Table A.) with the annual variation attributable primarily to petroleum 
production and price.  The $149 billion (2010 $) in direct petroleum revenues (taxes and royalties) 
has allowed taxes on other industries to be kept low and on households to be eliminated.1  At the 
same time state government spending has expanded to a level twice that of the rest of the nation 
on a per capita basis. 
 About 25 percent of direct petroleum revenues has been deposited into two savings 
accounts—the Alaska Permanent Fund and the smaller Constitutional Budget Reserve.  The 
earnings on these savings accounts and direct petroleum revenues together have accounted for 
92 percent of total state revenues from own sources (excluding federal transfers).  And 89 percent 
of total state spending has come from direct petroleum revenues and earnings on savings 
accounts.  
Largely because of the windfall from petroleum, the state economy—measured by per-capita 
income and the unemployment rate—has been strong since the 1970s.  However, these statewide 
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average economic indicators mask important regional differences in economic performance. In 
particular, the remote rural part of the state off the road system, which is home to about half of the 
Native American population, is burdened with high costs and few employment opportunities in the 
cash economy. The small villages in that region have little cash income and are reliant primarily on 
government assistance and subsistence harvesting of fish and game for their existence. 
Two outside interests continue to be important in the economy—the federal government and 
the large oil companies that have leased and developed the oil fields.  Both are perceived often to 
work at cross purposes with state interests and thus their presence fosters the notion that the state 
must continue the struggle to take control of its economic future.  The shared public ownership of 
the natural resource wealth of the state is a vehicle to accomplish that goal. 
2. Origins and Evolution of the Alaska Permanent Fund 
In its first decade as a state, Alaska had a small tax base in relation to its public needs and 
struggled to pay its bills.  In 1968 oil was discovered at Prudhoe Bay on state land and the 
subsequent lease sale generated $900 million dollars for the state treasury--a bonanza 
compared to the $128 million annual budget at that time.  Government spending increased in 
anticipation of the petroleum revenues that would come with production, but construction of a 
pipeline to take the oil to market was delayed.  Before production revenues began to flow into 
the treasury, the state had spent the entire bonus and was essentially forced to borrow from the 
oil companies against the future revenues they would be paying.2 
This experience was an important lesson for Alaskans.  When oil had been discovered the idea 
of a saving account was discussed at a series of citizen conferences sponsored by the Alaska 
legislature.  They were motivated by the realization that the state was suddenly wealthy beyond 
belief.  The Prudhoe Bay field was an “elephant” in the language of petroleum geologists—clearly a 
once in a lifetime opportunity.  There was almost no likelihood of additional discoveries of that size, 
so the production and revenues from the North Slope would be a temporary phenomenon.  The 
question was how convert that windfall into sustainable economic prosperity. 
The consensus at that time was that the establishment of a saving account should wait until 
production began, and that the lease sale bonanza could be better spent on infrastructure 
development.  The rapid disappearance of that bonanza, whether it was actually well spent or 
squandered, convinced most Alaskans of the need for a saving account.  It would be the only 
way to keep some of the oil revenues away from a profligate legislature and preserve some of 
the petroleum wealth for future generations. 
Some people argued against the idea of a public savings account, either on ideological or 
practical grounds.  One argument was that saving was not an appropriate government function, 
but rather should be left to the private sector.  This view however, ignored the problem with purely 
private savings--the Alaska population was the most transient in the nation.  Future generations of 
Alaskans, not yet born or not yet resident in the state, would be unlikely to benefit from the private 
saving of current residents.  Another was that there was enough petroleum to ensure that the 
economic development of the state would continue into the future for generations.  Under a 
scenario of continuously growing prosperity, saving would be a mistake. 
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The question was put to a vote of the people in 1976 and they approved the creation of the 
Alaska Permanent Fund by a two to one margin.3   Capitalization would come from deposits of at 
least 25 percent of the mineral royalties collected on state lands.  The fund would invest in income 
producing investments.  Fund earnings could be spent, but the principal would be permanently 
protected.  All other details about the fund were left to the legislature to work out. 
The most important questions for the fund were the contribution rate, investment philosophy, 
management structure, and disposition of earnings. All were decided openly in legislative hearings 
after public discussions throughout the state. 
The choice of the contribution rate was important because putting aside too little would not 
guarantee benefits for future generations while saving too much would underfund the needs of the 
current generation.  The legislature generally followed the guideline established in the language of 
the vote in depositing 25 percent of royalties into the fund.4  However on occasion they have 
added to the fund balance with special contributions, motivated both by a desire to save more 
and to reduce the temptation of future legislatures to overspend any current surplus. However there 
has never been a formal determination of a target amount that should be saved in order to 
balance current against future needs. 
The question of investment philosophy was a protracted debate over whether the fund should 
be a development fund or a savings account.  It was ultimately won by those favoring a savings 
account. 
A development fund would invest in Alaska projects designed to strengthen and diversify the 
economy, so when the state no longer had an economic base from oil, other sectors would be 
strong enough to take its place.  Supporters of this position argued that there were many projects 
that could help the state economy grow but which could not secure financing either because the 
capital market was not working due to remoteness and the small size of the economy, or that some 
projects required a capital subsidy in order to move forward.  In either case, the Permanent Fund 
could be the vehicle to concentrate state efforts to build a more diversified state economy through 
investments in public infrastructure, industrial development, and housing.  Supporters of this view 
argued that a portfolio of bonds and stocks would not generate benefits for Alaskans. 
Proponents of the savings account approach argued that investing in a portfolio of financial 
assets not directly linked to the Alaska economy would maximize the long run financial earnings of 
the fund, and that those earnings would then be available to the state for any purpose in the future    
Investing outside the state would diversify the overall economic portfolio of the state--an important 
consideration for an economy with a history of cycles of boom and bust.   A state development 
fund would, they believed, be driven by political rather than economic decisions.  Basing 
investment choices on politics would produce neither a positive financial return for the state nor a 
strong portfolio of investments. 
The fund was initially managed within the Department of Revenue with other state funds until the 
legislature established an independent state corporation, the Permanent Fund Corporation, to 
manage the fund portfolio.  The corporation is insulated from but not independent of the other 
branches of government.  The governor appoints the six members of the board of trustees who set 
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fund policy, and the director oversees the investments.  The corporation mission is clearly defined to 
be financial management.  It has no role in determining how fund income is to be used. 
The constitutional amendment creating the fund gave the legislature authority to spend fund 
income consisting of interest, dividends, and realized capital gains, but the fund itself must be 
preserved.  In practice this has been interpreted to mean that the inflation adjusted value of the 
cumulative deposits into the fund must be preserved.5  This is accomplished through “inflation 
proofing”, an annual deposit of a portion of income back into the fund to preserve its value.6 
In practice fund income has been retained by the corporation until appropriated by the 
legislature rather than automatically transferred to the state general fund.  This separate account is 
a contingency fund which can be used to supplement current year earnings to pay “inflation 
proofing” or the Permanent Fund dividend if current year earnings should fall short.7  Keeping this 
accumulated income with the corporation has also protected  it from appropriation by the 
legislature for other purposes. 
The most significant change in the structure and management of the Permanent Fund since its 
formative years has been the liberalization of its investment policy to maximize its potential for long 
term growth.  Over time the board has asked for and received permission from the legislature on 
several occasions to expand the categories of investments that the portfolio could hold, as well as 
adjust the target range for the allocation among different categories of investments.  The fund 
portfolio now invests globally in stocks, bonds, real estate, and private equities.  The investment 
policy is the “prudent investor” rule. This means that “the corporation shall exercise the judgment 
and care under the circumstances then prevailing that an institutional investor of ordinary 
prudence, discretion and intelligence exercises in the designation and management of large 
investments entrusted to it”.8  
This has increased the volatility in annual realized income.  A recent suggestion to manage the 
fund like an endowment would reduce this volatility, would automatically protect it against 
inflation, and would provide more flexibility for management of the fund portfolio.  Even though 
supported by the corporation, it has not been adopted, largely out of suspicion by the public that 
any change in the management of the fund was an attack on the Permanent Fund dividend.9 
By 2010 the fund had grown to $32 billion (Table B.).  Of this total $12 billion had come from 
required royalty deposits, $7 billion from occasional special contributions, and $13 billion from 
“inflation proofing”. Over its lifetime the fund has averaged a total return of 8.7%,and has 
generated realized income totaling $35 billion.  About half of this income has been used to pay the 
Permanent Fund dividend.  The rest has either  been put back into the fund as “inflation proofing” 
or retained in the contingency account.  
3. Accounting for the Success of the Permanent Fund 
The Permanent Fund has successfully transformed a portion of state non-sustainable petroleum 
revenues into a sustainable financial asset that can produce an annual flow of income for future 
generations of Alaskans.  In doing so it has also helped to constrain the growth of public spending 
and moderated the economic cycles generated by price sensitive fluctuating oil revenues.  
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Although the ultimate success of the fund will depend on its role in Alaska’s transition to a post 
petroleum economy, we can attribute its current success to a number of factors. 
First, by a vote of the people that amended the state constitution, the fund was created as a 
separate institution with the sole purpose of managing the financial windfall.  There was strong 
support behind its purpose-- to prevent wasteful spending and conserve the resource, and that 
purpose was not complicated by having the fund deal with two politically complex issues--the 
collection of revenues and the use of income.  In practice, the dedicated royalty deposits have 
been like an automatic payroll deduction into a retirement account that has grown in value over 
time. 
The fund has not been involved in the management of the petroleum wealth of the state.  The 
laws governing petroleum taxes are written by the legislature and both the negotiations over 
royalties (governed by contracts between the state and lessee) and the collection of petroleum 
revenues are the responsibility of various departments within the administration.   
Differing opinions about the optimal tax rates and royalty terms that will maximize benefits to the 
state result in constant attempts by both industry and the state government to make adjustments, 
but the fund is not involved in these disputes.  These disputes center around the fair share of 
revenues that should go to the state rather than the appropriate amount of revenue to fund 
particular state programs.  These disputes have resulted in several significant changes in tax policy 
over the years.  
Nor is the fund involved in the valuation of production which is the basis for the calculation of 
taxes and royalties.  Differences of opinion on these valuations often end up being litigated by the 
courts. 
There have been cases of corruption involving the bribery of legislators in an attempt to 
influence petroleum taxes and other legislation impacting the industry, but since the fund has no 
role in tax policy, it has been insulated from those matters. 
The fund has also been insulated from any role in determining how to use income which is a 
political charged issue.   This has left the fund free to concentrate on its job, and it has been easy to 
evaluate its performance. 
This institutional structure is different from that of two other petroleum funds against which Alaska 
is often compared.  Both the Norwegian Government Pension Fund and the Alberta Heritage 
Savings Trust Fund are more closely integrated into the annual budget making process.  In 
particular, all petroleum revenues are deposited into the Norwegian fund from which the annual 
budget is financed.  Although that model has worked well in Norway, it is hard to imagine this 
structure would maintain fiscal discipline given the political environment in Alaska where the 
government is continuously expected to generate economic activity and stimulate economic 
development. 
The Alberta fund was created by legislative action and originally had four goals.  These were to 
provide savings for the future, to reduce the government debt load, to improve the quality of life of 
the province, and to strengthen and diversify the economy.  A decade later it was clear that this 
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multi-pronged approach was not working and since then that fund has adopted a clearer focus on 
financial return.10 
Second, Alaska has collected more oil revenues than originally expected  and has taken 
advantage of the occasions when revenues were high to create some programs that have 
diffused potential pressure to expand the role of the Permanent Fund.  The petroleum revenue 
stream dedicated to the fund, 25 percent of royalties, is only about 10 percent of total annual 
petroleum revenues (including taxes).  This has left 90 percent for the legislature and governor to 
spend on reducing taxes for businesses and households and for expanding programs.  Shortly after 
the fund was created, petroleum revenues increased dramatically and this allowed the 
establishment and funding of a number of agencies--including the Alaska Renewable Resources 
Corporation, Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority (AIDEA), the Alaska Housing 
Finance Corporation (AHFC), the Alaska Science and Technology Foundation, the Alaska Energy 
Authority, and the Alaska Aerospace Development Corporation—designed to promote economic 
development in the state.  These agencies relieved pressure on the Permanent Fund to serve as the 
development bank. 
Sometime later another surge in revenues allowed the state to establish another fund, the 
Constitutional Budget Reserve, for the purpose of buffering government spending against annual 
fluctuations in petroleum revenues.  The state can borrow from this reserve in low revenue years, but 
is required to pay it back in high revenue years.  Like the Permanent Fund, the $9 billion in this 
account represents petroleum revenues saved. 
Third, there is a continuing perception that the state had squandered its original bonanza—the 
$900 million in bonuses collected in 1968.  It is felt that the best way to avoid that mistake again is to 
put any new windfalls into the Permanent Fund, where they will be safe from wasteful spending.  
Over time $7 billion has been added to the fund through special deposits motivated by the desire 
to get the money “off the table”.  This impulse has been amplified by a strong general underlying 
desire to control government operations spending to avoid the necessity of imposing taxes. 
Taken together, the constitutionally required deposits into the Permanent Fund from royalties, the 
special deposits into the Permanent Fund, and the payments into the Constitutional Budget Reserve 
amount to 25 percent of direct petroleum revenues collected since North Slope production began. 
Fourth, the fund has a policy of not investing in Alaska.  It looks worldwide to build a portfolio to 
maximize long term return on investment adjusted for risk.  In this way it avoids any political pressure 
to funnel money into particular investments favored by powerful individuals or groups or to invest in 
local projects that produce a non monetary benefit rather than a financial return. 
Fifth, the fund and the corporation are probably the most highly respected institutions in the 
state.  This partly stems from the fact that many of Alaska’s most respected leaders, such as former 
Governor Jay Hammond, helped guide the formation of the fund and have been continuing 
advocates.  In addition the fund has been fortunate to have on the board many members 
perceived to be visionary and responsible custodians, such as banker Elmer Rasmuson, the first 
board chairman.  They have also been able to attract high quality staff, both from within and 
outside the state, beginning with the first executive director, Dave Rose. 
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The transparency of the operations of the corporation is evident in numerous ways.  Board 
meetings are open to the public and held in communities throughout the state.  The corporation 
publishes a clearly written annual report, produces educational materials for Alaskans, and 
maintains a speaker’s bureau.  One can  access a current list of portfolio holdings on a daily basis, 
the value of the fund, and detailed minutes of past board meetings from the corporation web 
site.11  It reports annually to the legislature.   Finally, because Alaska is a small state, the board 
members are widely known in their communities. 
As a result the public has a high degree of confidence that the fund is being well managed.  
Second guessing the investment decisions of the corporation is not a popular pastime even in times 
of down markets.  The attention of the public is concentrated on the issue of how to collect the fair 
share of petroleum wealth from the companies producing oil in the state.  Once the wealth has 
been converted to financial assets the public feels confident that these assets will be professionally 
managed for their benefit. 
And finally, the Permanent Fund dividend received by each citizen has created a constituency 
protecting the fund.  Although setting aside some petroleum revenues for the future makes sense 
and was easy to understand at the time of the original windfall, it has since become harder to 
support for several reasons.  First it is hard to convince people to save for a future that does not 
involve them.  The Alaska population is quite transient with people continually moving into and out 
of the state.  If a current resident might move away in the future, or even see his neighbors 
replaced by someone new from another state, he is less likely to want to save for the future and 
more likely to want to spent the wealth today.  Second, it is hard to educate new residents who 
have no experience of Alaska before the windfall, of the need to save.  A region, like Norway, with 
closed borders, does not have this problem. 
In addition, there is a great temptation to spend when there is a big pot of cash that appears to 
be sitting idle and not benefiting the public.  In such an environment there will be an infinite number 
of suggestions for ways to “put that money to work”.  Some will be good and some not so good, 
but they will be endless and the pressure to spend will be relentless.  
It can be argued that the fund would not have survived without the dividend.  It is hard to see 
how the fund would have grown to its current size without the protection it has gotten from its 
constituency, but the state has established other saving accounts, most notably the Constitutional 
Budget Reserve, that are forward looking.  Alaska probably would still have a fund if there had 
been no dividend, but it would be much smaller. 
4. Origin and Evolution of the Permanent Fund Dividend 
In its first years the annual earnings of the Permanent Fund were small and attracted little 
attention.  Then in 1979 the price of oil increased dramatically as a result of the Iranian Revolution, 
and Alaska oil revenues quadrupled.  
The higher oil price was expected to be permanent and the legislature began the task of 
spending all these new revenues.  The personal income tax was eliminated and the operating and 
capital budgets increased.  Several new state agencies were established and capitalized.  And a  
number of loan programs benefiting businesses and households were established. 
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The distribution of all this new wealth was reminiscent of the earlier experience of the wasteful 
spending of the lease bonus windfall.  Furthermore the benefits from the elimination of taxes, the 
increased spending, the new agencies, and the loan programs all targeted particular population 
groups or businesses.  There was a feeling that government was spending wastefully, and that the 
benefits of the spending were not distributed equitably across the population. 
Against this background the question of what to do with the income from the Permanent Fund 
was debated in the legislature.   The governor at the time, Jay Hammond, had been a commercial 
fisherman in a small village in rural Alaska. He had seen how the benefits from harvesting a publicly 
owned resource--fish from the sea--were inequitably distributed and went mostly to nonresidents of 
the state.  He proposed an annual cash distribution to all citizens as a means of ensuring that 
everyone benefited from oil production on state-owned lands.  
His original proposal, put forward in 1980 and known as "Alaska, Inc.," was to pay every eligible 
Alaskan a dividend based on length of residency up to a maximum of 25 years.  That feature was 
designed to help stabilize the transient population, reward longevity, and minimize dividend related 
migration.12 
The arguments in favor of the program included the notion that individuals were in a better 
position to know how to spend money for their own benefit than politicians, and that the dividend 
would control the growth of the public sector.  Overexpansion of government would be bad for the 
economy in the long run after the oil revenues ran out.  But others felt it was in the best interest of 
the state to decide communally how the money would be spent, presumably on public goods—
especially public infrastructure and loan programs. That would stimulate economic development.  
Others felt that a large portion of the money would be wasted, and were particularly concerned 
with how people receiving “free money”, particularly those with low incomes, would respond.  
Others felt there might be a backlash in Washington DC against Alaska if the state were seen as 
giving away money. 
The dividend faced a battle in the legislature, partly because it did not have a strong 
constituency or organized interest group to support it politically as did loan programs and capital 
expenditures.  In spite of this, “Alaska, Inc.” did pass the legislature but it was ruled unconstitutional 
because it did not conform to the equal treatment clause of the U.S. Constitution.  Anticipating this 
ruling, the legislature passed the current dividend plan that paid each qualified Alaska resident 
regardless of age an equal amount out of the earnings of the Permanent Fund.  
The only requirement for eligibility is one year of residency in the state prior to the payment year 
and the intent to remain a resident in the future.  Typically about 95 percent of the population, 
including children, receives the dividend in the last quarter of the year, about 6 months after 
submitting an application establishing residency under the rules of the program. 
The amount available for the dividend each year is half of the nominal fund earnings averaged 
over the previous 5 year period.13  As the Permanent Fund has grown the dividend has increased in 
size although it has fluctuated considerably in size from year to year.14   In 2010 it represented a 3 
percent increment to per capita personal income for the average resident.15 
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The annual aggregate dividend distribution is significant in relation to other sources of income 
that enter the economy.  The $858 million in 2010 is half as big as the entire payroll of the mining and 
petroleum sectors ($1.664 billion). Since the dividend income comes from non petroleum related 
investments made outside the state, it is like adding a new basic industry to the economy.  This 
diversification of income sources acts as a stabilizing force on the economy. 
After the initial dividend distribution a comprehensive study of its impact and public attitudes 
about it was done to help determine whether to continue the program.  Sixty percent of Alaskans 
surveyed thought the dividend was a good idea, 29 percent had mixed feelings, and 10 percent 
thought it was a bad idea. (One percent did not know.)  When asked to compare the dividend 
with alternative uses of the funds it was clear that respondents preferred uses that distributed funds 
to households over public construction or more saving.  Respondents however were 
overwhelmingly in favor of “inflation proofing”.16  
Every subsequent survey has confirmed the overwhelming, but not universal, popularity of the 
program.  For example a non-random survey in 1989 found only 15 percent of respondents were 
willing to increase state revenues by eliminating the dividend.  Somewhat larger percentages were 
willing to put a cap on its size or spend funds in the contingency account.17 
Although the Permanent Fund balance, which ultimately determines the size of the dividend, is 
constitutionally protected, there is no such guarantee for the earnings or the dividend. The 
legislature has the authority to change the formula at any time and could, by law, eliminate it 
entirely. Its only guarantee is its political popularity. No legislator would suggest a change in the 
formula that would reduce its amount or the share of Permanent Fund income allocated to the 
dividend for fear of losing the next and all subsequent elections. 
The dividend also instantaneously created a constituency for the Permanent Fund itself. Without 
a group keeping an eye on the legislature, the fund could have fallen prey to special interests. Such 
interests might spend the earnings inappropriately, invest the fund balance in capital projects with 
no financial return, or eliminate “inflation proofing”. 
The best example of how sensitive the legislature has become to the appearance of reducing 
the dividend is the special legislative contributions that have been deposited into the fund over the 
years.  These special contributions increase the balance of the fund, future income, and with it, the 
size of the dividend in future years.  Legislators are willing to make these special contributions even 
though they reduce the amount of money they could spend to satisfy special constituencies.  It is 
ironic that the legislature has willingly contributed to a fund established specifically to protect 
against wasteful legislative spending. 
The basic structure of the dividend program has not changed since it was introduced.  Changes 
have involved better definition of eligibility (length of residence and intent to remain) and 
streamlining the payment method.  Originally the annual payment was by check delivered through 
the mail, a process that took several weeks.  Now most dividends are paid electronically directly 
into recipient bank accounts, all on the same day. 
Policies have also been established to deal with special situations.  For example certain federal 
aid programs for low-income families are contingent on monthly income. To offset loss of aid 
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income to those families when they receive their dividend, the state instituted a "hold harmless"  
program. This is a payment to those families in compensation for their temporary loss of federal 
assistance.  The state also acts as trustee for children who are wards of the state, managing their 
dividends until they reach adulthood. 
When the annual dividend payment is distributed, retailers compete to lure recipients to spend 
as much of their checks as possible. The local media attention concentrating on the story about 
how people spend their dividends also contributes to a "consumption-frenzy" atmosphere. This 
atmosphere could be part of the source of the “wasteful” spending cited by some dividend critics. 
The distribution method could be structured in any of a number of different ways, but there has 
been little interest in changing it.  For example the dividend could be accompanied by information 
on good consumer spending habits or how to use the dividend to better manage consumer debt.  
The dividend could be distributed on a monthly basis. 
The presentation of the dividend could also be "framed" in a way that guides consumer 
decisions in a particular direction.  For example the current method does not offer a simple saving 
alternative for recipients either at the time of application or of distribution. Since 1991 applicants 
have been able to designate a part of their dividend to a University of Alaska Section 529 College 
Savings Plan established for the benefit of a child. Plan earnings are tax free under current law, and 
the proceeds can be used to pay qualified expenses at the University of Alaska or any other eligible 
institution of higher learning. Since its inception there have been about 80 thousand individual 
deposits into these accounts via PFD applications. The “pick-click-give” program which started in 
2009 allows applicants to direct a portion of their dividend to charitable organizations. About 5 
thousand people used the program in its first year, and an estimated 10 thousand  in 2010.   
However there has never been a policy discussion of what the best framing structure would be 
and whether it should include other options for investing or creating a “grubstake”—a means to 
allow a person to accumulate enough cash for a special opportunity, like starting a business.  This is 
probably because of the feeling among the public that the decision about how the dividend is 
spent is no business of government. 
But a large share of dividends go to children, and there are no special conditions associated 
with them.  In the 1984 study, about half of the households that included children reported that the 
decision about how the children’s dividends would be spent was shared between the child and 
the parent. In the other half of households, the parents alone made the decision about how to 
allocate that money. While parents certainly should be responsible for the well-being of their 
children, one must wonder if children spending dividend checks is a sensible public policy either in 
terms of the benefits the children get from those expenditures or from the lessons the children learn 
about responsible financial management from the experience. There seems to be a good case for 
coordinating some personal finance education into the school curriculum when the dividend is 
distributed. 
Dividend recipients are not required to participate in any community functions like voting, or 
attending community meetings, or even to be knowledgeable about the source of the funds they 
are receiving. The application process could be expanded to provide an education function so 
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that people would have a better understanding of why the dividend was established and what it 
means. It could also be used to informally engage the public to think about important public policy 
issues. 
5. Public Attitudes Towards the Dividend 
The dividend has broad but not universal public support.  The most frequently heard arguments 
in its favor are as follows: 
1. Since the Permanent Fund consists of royalty payments from oil owned by the state, the 
earnings rightfully belong to the citizens of the state. 
2. Individuals can put the earnings to better use than allowing government to decide how to 
spend the money. 
3. The dividend is the most equitable way to distribute the benefits from the production of 
state owned resources. 
4. The dividend is a major economic stimulus for the economy (large economic multiplier). 
5. Without the dividend the balance of economic activity would be weighted too heavily in 
favor of the public sector. 
6. Ending the program would be regressive—it would hurt poor families proportionately more 
than well-to-do families. 
7. The dividend protects against a raid on the Permanent Fund. 
8. The dividend is spent on basic needs of Alaska families. 
9. The dividend keeps most of the dollars within the state. 
10. The dividend is a stabilizing force for the economy otherwise subject to resource generated 
cycles. 
11. The dividend levels the income distribution in the state. 
12. Life in Alaska is tough.  I deserve it. 
13. I pay Alaska taxes.  I should get something back. 
Support for the program has certainly been bolstered by the increase in the share of the 
population unfamiliar with the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Permanent Fund and 
by the increase over time in the size of the dividend payment.  Some supporters have suggested 
protecting the dividend payment, now at the discretion of the legislature, by putting it into the state 
constitution, but for now it seems well protected simply by the strength of its popularity.  
But for every argument in support of the dividend, there is one opposed.  The list includes the 
following: 
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1. The dividend should be reinvested in the Permanent Fund to better provide for our future 
needs. 
2. We should be investing the dividend money in something tangible, like physical 
infrastructure to help stimulate economic development. 
3. Much of the dividend is spent on frivolous consumption goods—alcohol, etc. 
4. Many people use their dividends to take vacations and so spend their money out of the 
state. 
5. A big chunk of dividend dollars must be paid to the federal government in higher personal 
taxes.  We should spend the dividend money in ways that don’t leak out of the state. 
6. We should not be giving money away if we want to convince the federal government to 
keep sending us grants based on need. 
7. The dividend fosters a culture of dependence on government that is neither healthy nor 
sustainable. 
8. The dividend fosters a culture of consumption, when what Alaska needs is more investment. 
9. The dividend attracts undesirable people to move into the state, putting a burden on 
current residents. 
10. There is no reason the government should be giving checks to Alaska millionaires. 
11. The dividend makes it impossible to use any Permanent Fund earnings to finance essential 
government services. 
12. Life is great in Alaska.  There is no need to pay me just to live here. 
Between the supporters and opponents of the dividend are those who recognize its 
overwhelming popularity, but are fearful that it will become too big, which has generally meant an 
amount slightly larger than the current dividend.  But suggestions to “cap” the dividend at $500, 
$1,000 or some larger amount have never garnered much support. 
Alaskans are in agreement that Alaska has the right to the resource rents from petroleum 
production on state land.  Where there is disagreement is around the question of whether 
ownership rests with the people communally or individually.  If communally, then decisions about 
how to spend the royalties from oil should be made by the legislature representing the citizens of 
the state. If individually, then the citizens as individuals should make those decisions. 
Those who consider the ownership to be communal are more likely to view the dividend as a 
government program which distributes income. Those who consider the ownership to be individual 
are more likely to view the dividend as a distribution of their ownership share of the petroleum 
wealth and to view the government role as simply facilitating that distribution. 
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Because of these two viewpoints,  some Alaskans, as well as many non-Alaskans, view the 
dividend as a socialistic government handout while at the same time many other Alaskans view it 
as a payment based on a private property right.  Those who view it as a government handout 
decry the entitlement mentality they see fostered by the payment.  Those who view it as a property 
right feel the government has no business getting involved in managing its disposition.  
These different viewpoints have existed since the dividend was introduced and show no sign of 
resolution. 
6. Economic and Social Effects of the PFD 
One concern with a natural resource windfall is that when spent locally it will overheat an 
economy leading to inflation, an erosion of competitiveness, and eventually slower economic 
growth.  In a state within a nation, like Alaska, this is less a concern because its open border allows 
increases in local demand to be met by in migration of goods, services, and workers, thus 
minimizing the inflationary pressure from increased spending. 
The Permanent Fund acts as a buffer between the collection of petroleum revenues and the 
spending of those revenues.  By removing the automatic connection between the two, it has a 
moderating effect on the economic boom created by the windfall—both in the short and the long 
run.  It siphons part of the windfall away from current spending and reallocates it to some future 
time. 
The current practice of the Permanent Fund is not the only way to moderate this connection.  
For example if all Permanent Fund earnings to date had been reinvested, it would be twice as large 
today.  We would be able to spend more in the future because we had spent less in the past.  
Another distribution scheme that was initially proposed was to put all petroleum revenues into a 
special fund from which the earnings would be drawn to spend on public programs.  This would 
have ensured that the economy would not become overheated in the short term, but at the cost 
of shifting most of the benefits of the windfall to future generations.18 
Alaskans are most interested in how their friends and neighbors spend their dividend checks.  The 
infusion of cash increases the demand for consumer goods and services which generates 
employment and payroll growth, particularly in the retail trade and personal services parts of the 
economy.  The increase in purchasing power cascades through the economy producing 
additional employment and payroll until it leaks out of the stream of local purchases as purchases 
outside the region, savings, and taxes.  The newly created jobs will mostly be filled by an inflow of 
workers from outside the state who will bring their families with them.  According to one estimate, 
ultimately the economy will be larger by roughly 7 thousand additional jobs and $1.1 billion (2010 $) 
in additional personal income.  Population  will be about 12 thousand larger.19  A more precise 
estimate is impossible because little is known about exactly how households spend their dividends. 
The economic and social effects of the dividend have not been much studied.  Alaskans tend 
to view the disposition of dividend income as a private matter that is not the business of 
government to be investigating. Even if it were viewed as a public program rather than a distribution 
of earnings, there is little tradition in Alaska for program evaluation. Furthermore, because almost 
everyone in the state receives the dividend, it is difficult to construct statistical analyses that allow 
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researchers to isolate the effects of the dividend from all the other factors simultaneously 
impacting behavior. And finally, much of the data that would go into such studies is not of high 
enough quality to support rigorous statistical analyses. 
A popular method for determining what people have done with their dividend checks is to ask 
them directly when they have them in hand. An informal survey conducted by the Permanent Fund 
Corporation in 1994 reported that three-quarters of respondents planned to save half or more of 
their dividend (including reducing their level of debt).20  Although this is an indication of what 
people did with their checks when they got them, it does not tell us how the dividend effects their 
consumption behavior.  For example, some people said they used their dividend to buy winter 
clothes for their children. While it may be true that the dividend check was used in that way, it is 
unlikely that most parents, had they not received a dividend, would have deprived their children of 
winter coats in the harsh Northern environment. 
Alaskans have come to expect the dividend each year.  Although they understand that its 
exact size will not be known until shortly before it is distributed, they tend to treat it as a permanent 
increase in their income. Consistent with the permanent income hypothesis, they will spread the 
additional consumption made possible by the dividend over their entire lifetime, probably on more 
of the same types of goods and services they would have consumed without the dividend income. 
According to this theory, consumption should not increase noticeably at the time of the dividend 
distribution. 
However, the anecdotal evidence, responses of people when directly asked, and a study of the 
pattern of receipts at retail outlets in communities across the state all suggest that consumer 
purchases, as distinct from consumption, do tend to concentrate around the time that the dividend 
checks arrive. One reason for this is that a large dividend or the combination of several dividends 
together provides some recipients with the “liquidity” necessary to buy an expensive consumer 
durable that provides consumption benefits lasting a long time—appliances, snow machines, etc.  
Hence the concentration of these consumer-durable purchases is not inconsistent with the 
permanent income hypothesis of smoothed consumption. 
A second reason for purchases to be concentrated during the dividend distribution season is 
that businesses compete for a share of the dividend dollars through advertising campaigns, sales, 
and other types of special offers. Timing the purchase of a new boat motor or a trip to Hawaii with 
the dividend distribution season can be a smart consumer decision. It also is a happy coincidence 
for retailers that the distribution comes at the beginning of the Christmas shopping season when 
people are in a mood to spend.21 
But even though spending increases when the dividend is distributed, anecdotal evidence 
suggests a large share of the distribution is  saved.  This was to be expected in the early years of the 
program since people did not know if it would continue so it was viewed as a windfall.  Although 
that is no longer the case, the fact that the dividend is a large lump sum might provide an incentive 
for some saving that would not otherwise occur.   More significant is the saving by parents of 
dividends paid to children.  
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If we look for lasting impacts of the dividend, no one has tried to demonstrate that the 
additional discretionary income, either spent or saved, has had a lasting effect enhancing the 
economic well being of Alaska households.  Neither has anyone tried to demonstrate that the 
dividend has expanded economic development activities.  The fear of some is that it has created a 
consumption oriented environment and that households have not used the opportunity it provides 
to increase their private wealth, or to increase their personal freedom. 
But this begs the question of how the success of the program should be evaluated.  Without the 
dividend program the money would most likely have been spent on activities designed to 
strengthen and diversify the economy--physical infrastructure, loan programs for businesses and 
households, and expenditures to support development of new industrial activities.  But the state has 
spent a considerable amount on these activities with only limited success.  Much of this spending 
targeting economic development could better be characterized as consumption rather than 
investment in that it has produced temporary economic growth, but not necessarily sustained 
development. 
Furthermore strictly on the basis of income delivered to Alaska households, an important criterion 
for public expenditures in Alaska, the dividend does a better job than capital investments or 
government spending on operations.22 
Two features of the dividend—it is an equal distribution to all residents and it is taxable as 
personal income by the federal government—contribute to it helping to level the income 
distribution.  The dividend adds a larger percentage to after-tax income at the lower end of the 
distribution than at the upper end.23 
The dividend establishes a floor below which the cash income of residents cannot fall, but it is 
not large enough by itself to provide a basic level of income for a household and was never 
designed for that purpose.  There are a number of federal and state “safety net” programs like 
social security, the earned income tax credit, unemployment insurance, and food stamps that help 
to lift people above the poverty income level.  The federal poverty guidelines of the U.S. Dept of 
Health and Human Services defined the poverty level for a two-person household in Alaska in 2009 
to be $18,210.24  Consequently as an addition to the “safety net” the dividend has been one factor 
in the decline in the official poverty rate since Alaska attained statehood, particularly among 
Native Americans.  The Native American poverty rate fell from 25 percent to 19 percent between 
the census years of 1980 and 1990.25  
The dividend is particularly important in rural parts of the state where the economy is largely a 
mixture of government cash-based transfers and subsistence activities and where cash 
employment is scarce. Households are cash poor and the subsistence harvests can fluctuate 
dramatically from year to year. Under these circumstances the cash provided by the dividend is 
particularly important not only because of its size but also its relative predictability. 
Although there is considerable migration out of these villages to locations with greater 
employment opportunities and better social services, most of these villages continue to exist 
because the residents prefer the subsistence lifestyle.  However it is very expensive to provide 
adequate public services to these communities and the social conditions are often poor. Although 
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the dividend provides much needed cash to the residents of these villages,  it may be enabling or 
empowering people to remain in rural Alaska instead of moving to places where jobs are more 
readily available and public services less expensive. Although it is difficult to weigh and compare 
the supportive and enabling effects of the dividend for residents of these communities, both effects 
need to be recognized. 
Economic theory suggests that an unconditional payment like the dividend would reduce the 
supply of labor and increase the wage rate. In the 1984 study of the early dividend program, only 
one percent of survey respondents reported they worked less because of the dividend. This is to be 
expected since many lower-income Alaskans, those most sensitive to an unconditional increase of 
income, would prefer more work but are constrained in their opportunity to obtain employment in 
the cash economy.   On the other hand, the effects of a continuing dividend payment on labor 
supply might only become evident over time if workers choose an earlier retirement.  
There have been no studies that have tried to link the dividend to aspects of health or 
education status or other aspects of social well being (like the crime rate).  This is partly because 
Alaskans do not think of the dividend as a policy tool to address these problems and also because 
of the difficulty of identifying the effect of the dividend independent of other social welfare 
programs and other influences. For the same reasons, no one has investigated the influence of the 
dividend on personal attitudes about  empowerment, feelings of self-worth, sense of community, 
volunteerism, or other psychological factors. 
One of the potential effects of the dividend that concerns many Alaskans is its impact on 
population. The dividend is a subsidy to the cost of raising a child and that should increase the birth 
rate. In fact an unpublished study has suggested the birth rate in Alaska has increased 18 percent 
because of the dividend.26 
This seems unlikely for a number of reasons. First there is no indication of such a large effect in a 
simple comparison of the trend in the Alaska birth rate to the rest of nation. Second, studies of direct 
child subsidies in other countries, specifically designed to stimulate the birth rate, fail to report such 
dramatic impacts. And third, the effect of the dividend program on the birth rate is complicated 
because, although on the one hand it does directly lower the cost of raising a child, it also 
increases household income.  If the desired number of children falls with increasing income, the 
birth rate could potentially go down as a result of introduction of the dividend program. 
It is more likely that the dividend would influence population because it acts as a “population 
magnet.” The dividend is an obvious incentive to move to Alaska, independent of any increase in 
employment opportunities arising from jobs created by residents spending their dividends.  This 
effect should be concentrated among lower-income people and anyone not closely connected 
to the labor market.27  This population growth dilutes the size of the dividend and puts increased 
demand on public services. 
The over-65 population is increasing at a rate faster than any other state, and demand for public 
as well as non-profit programs providing services for lower-income individuals and families has also 
been growing rapidly.  But it is difficult to sort out the causes for these increases among various 
public programs for lower-income individuals, seniors, and others to be able to attribute any of it to 
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the dividend. No one responding to the 1984 survey indicated that they had moved to Alaska to 
get the dividend, and almost no one said they had decided not to move out of the state because 
of the dividend. 
But the dividend could also attract people who are in the labor market.  Relative wages in a 
region reflect differences in the cost of living and private and public amenities. The high wage in 
Alaska is compensation for the high cost of living, climate, and absence of many private amenities.  
The introduction of a dividend increases the attractiveness of Alaska and should be reflected in a 
compensating reduction in the wage rate as the labor supply increases when more people are 
attracted to the state.28  
If that were to occur, part of the benefit of the dividend would go to those businesses able to 
hire workers at the lower wage rate. The possibility of this type of effect underscores the necessity of 
considering what economists call the “general equilibrium” effects of cash transfers. When a policy 
like the dividend program is large enough to cause changes in relative prices that influence the 
allocation of resources and behavior, then looking only at direct effects will not capture all the 
important effects of that policy and could lead to incorrect conclusions about its benefits.  
The dividend has clearly shifted a considerable amount of resource wealth spending from the 
public to the private sector.   But we should define fiscal discipline more narrowly than that to mean 
measuring the benefits of public expenditures against the private loss from paying for them.   
Dividend supporters argue that the dividend substitutes for the missing personal income tax as the 
means of imposing fiscal discipline on the state budget.  In theory, the dividend needs to compete 
each year against other uses of fund earnings. But in practice that discipline is imposed only when 
other revenues are insufficient to completely fund the state budget.  It is only then that the tradeoff 
between funding the dividend or using the money to pay for public services is clearly delineated.  
At other times other means must be relied upon to impose discipline on the budget making 
process. 
Consequently one can argue that the public budgeting process would be more balanced if 
there were a special account dedicated only to payment of the annual dividend so that 
deliberations and decisions regarding the regular operating and capital budgets did not have to 
take into account their impact on the size of the dividend. 
The dividend is part of a unique fiscal system that results in an unusual relationship between the 
government and the people. An entire generation of Alaskans has been raised having received a 
dividend annually since birth without necessarily understanding the purpose for which it was 
created.  This generation has also never experienced paying for the state services they have 
received because petroleum revenues have covered all costs. This has fostered a distorted idea of 
the true cost of government and the sense that the role of the state is to provide public services at 
no cost and also to hand out cash to all citizens.  
For some citizens this means that their only connection with the state government is the 
Permanent Fund dividend check they receive.  Furthermore, because there are no personal taxes 
and receipt of the dividend carries no public responsibilities, the two together undermine the sense 
of community that comes from the need to collectively choose and fund public services.  Local 
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government services are also partly supported by state revenues, but because of local taxes, this 
disengagement is not as much a concern at the local level. 
An alternative to the current dividend program would be a community dividend distributed to 
each community based on the number of residents. Residents would be free to spend the 
community dividend any way they wanted, but they would have to jointly determine how it would 
be used. This would build community involvement.  Under such an arrangement it might be more 
likely that the money would purchase physical facilities that would produce continuing benefits for 
residents—current and future.  This would keep more of the money in Alaska (it would not be 
subject to the income tax or residents leaving with their dividend.), and at the same time increase 
the incentive for community action.  Of course the community dividend could also be used to 
reduce the local tax burden. 
7. Declining Petroleum Production and the Challenge Ahead 
The Permanent Fund and the Permanent Fund dividend face their biggest challenge in the 
coming decades. 
Alaska has relied almost entirely on petroleum revenues to fund government (about 89 percent) 
for almost 40 years.  But in the last 20 years production has dropped by two thirds and is projected 
to continue to decline at the same rate.  In recent years the high oil price has swelled the state 
treasury, but eventually petroleum revenues will fall with the inevitable decline in production.  
Growth of the Permanent Fund will slow as the deposit of royalty revenue slows.  The high petroleum 
revenues have contributed to growth of the economy, but the development of an alternative tax 
base to replace petroleum has not followed. 
There are two revenue sources available to replace declining petroleum revenues.  The first is 
taxes on households.29  Alaska is the only state with neither a personal income tax nor a general 
sales tax.  The second is the income  of the Permanent Fund.  Unfortunately taken together they 
would today generate considerably less revenue than petroleum, so many people think both of 
these alternative revenue sources will be needed in the future to pay for public services.    
The Permanent Fund was created to ensure that future generations of Alaskans would share in 
the benefits from the petroleum wealth.  Shortly thereafter the Permanent Fund dividend was 
created to ensure that the benefits to the current generation would be equitable, and that there 
would be a constituency to protect the fund from attack.  This constituency would serve as a proxy 
for those future generations not currently represented in the decision making process. 
Some would argue that this constituency has taken over the fund and turned it, de facto, into 
one that exists for the sole purpose of paying the Permanent Fund dividend.  It has been converted 
from a saving account into an income distribution fund. This is evident from the fact that many 
people now mistakenly refer to the Alaska Permanent Fund as the Alaska Permanent Dividend 
Fund.30 
The current practice regarding the distribution of fund income is first to pay the dividend, then 
“inflation proof” the fund, and finally to leave any remainder in the contingency account.  That 
would cover potential future income shortfalls that would otherwise make it impossible to fully fund 
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the dividend and “inflation proofing”.  Although this remainder fluctuates from year to year, it has 
averaged several hundred million dollars and the balance in the contingency account  tends to 
grow over time. 
There have been several attempts in the past, during periods of low petroleum revenues, to use 
the funds in this contingency account to help pay the costs of government operations.  In the later 
1980s a suggestion known as the 40-30-30 rule would have allocated 40 percent of income to the 
dividend, 30 percent to inflation proofing, and 30 percent to general fund spending through a new 
budget reserve fund.  It was proposed as an equitable distribution of earnings among current 
residents, future generations (inflation proofing) and public needs.  It was not adopted. 
An advisory vote in 1999 which asked if Permanent Fund income left after paying the dividend 
and “inflation proofing” should be used to help balance the state budget was defeated with 83 
percent opposed.  The fact that the governor called for an advisory vote on this question is 
particularly significant because the legislature already had the authority under law to appropriate 
not only the funds in the contingency account, but all the earnings of the fund. 
This example in particular demonstrates how sensitive policy makers have become to the 
suggestion of the use of fund earnings as a part of any long term solution for financing state 
government expenditures.  Most are loath to entertain such a suggestion for fear of being charged 
with mounting an attack against the dividend.  It has even been suggested that the only way to 
resolve the impasse is to “cash out” the entire Permanent Fund in one large distribution so that the 
public would no longer obsess over it.   
However there is an opposing point of view that the dividend is not an impediment to a solution 
to the long term fiscal problem faced by the state.  This view, espoused by the late governor Jay 
Hammond, is that the best way to balance public against private consumption is not to give the 
legislature direct access to the earnings of the Permanent Fund.  It is to give all the income of the 
fund to the residents and require that the government “claw back”-- in the form of income or other 
taxes--whatever it can convince the public is necessary to pay for public services.   
When petroleum revenues have disappeared, financing government through an income tax 
rather than fund earnings, would have several advantages.  First it imposes a direct link between 
the cost of public services and their perceived benefits.  Second the incidence of the burden of 
paying for government with an income tax would be progressive whereas reducing the dividend 
would be regressive.  Third, cutting the dividend would put the burden entirely on residents whereas 
non-residents would pay a share of an income tax.  And finally, because a state income tax is 
deductible from the federal income tax, the federal government would be paying a portion of the 
cost of state government.  
Arguments that support reducing the dividend rather than imposing an income tax include the 
apparent inefficiency of the government handing out money with one hand (the dividend) and 
taking it back with the other through taxation, the inequity of putting the burden of paying for 
government only on workers, and the disincentive to work and invest created by an income tax. 
In the end, given the high cost of government in Alaska, even imposing an income tax at rates 
considered confiscatory would probably not generate enough revenue to cover the cost of a very 
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basic level of government services so that some change in the way fund income is distributed will 
become necessary. 
However there is a third possible outcome for the problem of funding state government in the 
future.  That would be to use the Permanent Fund itself to balance the budget. This could be done 
without contravening the language of the constitutional amendment prohibiting expenditure of 
the fund itself in either of two ways.  The state could borrow against the balance to finance 
government, or it could stop inflation proofing.  Either would reduce the real value of fund assets 
over time, so this alternative is not an attractive outcome. 
As petroleum revenues fall this debate will intensify.  As the state moves into a post petroleum 
future, it is fortunate to have the Permanent Fund as a resource to help it make that transition.  
Whether that transition will be successful remains to be determined. 
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Table A. Alaska Petroleum Production, Revenues, and Savings (Nominal Million $) 












1977  7,492 831    482 168 314 4   
1978  9,088 1,616    492 289 203 51   
1979 10,863 2,234    906 570 336 84   
1980 15,138 5,939 2,601 1,223 1,378 344   
1981 21,665 10,801 3,689 2,173 1,516 385 900  
1982 23,348 10,469 3,975 2,393 1,582 401 800  
1983 22,548 8,352 3,448 1,882 1,565 421 400  
1984 23,829 8,785 3,228 1,789 1,439 366 300  
1985 26,219 10,572 3,116 1,686 1,425 368 300  
1986 18,849 4,345 2,981 1,355 1,626 323   
1987 22,258 7,948 1,565 871 694 171 1,264  
1988 21,307 7,113 2,368 1,073 1,295 418   
1989 23,357 7,799 2,069 955 1,114 228   
1990 24,987 8,483 2,388 1,209 1,180 267   
1991 22,164 5,514 3,297 1,554 1,743 435  291 
1992 22,591 5,321 2,592 1,288 1,305 338  247 
1993 22,965 4,849 3,197 1,202 1,995 315  914 
1994 23,110 4,336 1,939 771 1,168 210  437 
1995 24,805 5,432 3,478 980 2,499 318  1,543 
1996 26,083 6,984 2,514 1,017 1,498 264 1,842 586 
1997 25,171 5,035 2,889 1,245 1,644 308 803 570 
1998 23,312 2,699 1,906 829 1,077 231  343 
1999 23,866 2,682 1,119 565 554 156  50 
2000 25,913 3,901 2,402 910 1,491 311 280 448 
2001 27,747 3,450 2,274 1,087 1,187 339 7 49 
2002 28,887 3,947 1,671 724 994 258  90 
2003 30,905 4,511 2,059 799 1,261 398  22 
2004 34,408 6,174 2,430 998 1,432 368  8 
2005 37,824 7,820 3,357 1,430 1,928 481  27 
2006 41,820 9,919 4,344 1,915 2,429 601  44 
2007 44,288 10,365 5,115 2,868 2,246 532  101 
2008 48,551 13,288 11,239 7,510 3,729 844  438 
2009 45,709 na 5,954 3,715 2,239 651  122 
2010 na na 6,105 3,438 2,667 679  510 
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Alaska Department of Revenue, Alaska Permanent Fund 
Corporation.  All data is fiscal year except gross state product. 
Notes: Permanent Fund deposits shown here do not include inflation proofing.  CBR deposits come from 
petroleum revenues obtained through settlement of disputes with taxpayers. 
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Table B. Alaska Savings Accounts and Permanent Fund Dividend (Nominal $) 
 
Savings Account Balances 
(Million $) 
























1977  -      12,388 
1978  53 2   2  12,495 
1979  137 8   8  13,199 
1980  483 32   32  14,975 
1981  1,715 150   150  16,528 
1982  2,939 368   364 1,000 18,819 
1983  4,061 471    64 231 176   386 18,843 
1984  4,548 530   175 151 204   331 19,395 
1985  6,085 658   217 235 206   404 20,104 
1986  7,097 1,021   303 216 501   556 19,673 
1987  8,338 1,069   391 148 529   708 19,244 
1988  8,757 789   424 303 62   827 19,848 
1989  9,723 869   460 360 48   873 21,525 
1990  10,389 916   488 454 (26)   953 22,594 
1991 297 11,433 1,031   490 559 (18)   931 23,092 
1992 563 12,405 1,036   488 477 71   916 23,706 
1993 685 13,748 1,226   532 363 332   949 24,478 
1994 614 13,492 1,098   556 372 170   984 25,186 
1995 1,994 15,146 1,013   565 348 100   990 25,778 
1996 2,518 18,276 1,814   643 407 764 1,130 26,179 
1997 3,172 21,095 2,061   747 486 829 1,297 27,197 
1998 3,559 22,451 2,595   893 423 1,279 1,541 27,943 
1999 2,628 22,500 2,544 1,045 288 1,211 1,770 28,538 
2000 2,734 23,544 2,260 1,172 423 665 1,963 30,531 
2001 2,995 22,430 1,199 1,113 686 (600) 1,850 32,266 
2002 2,469 22,389 257   926 602 (1,271) 1,541 33,144 
2003 2,093 24,094 355   691 352 (688) 1,108 33,519 
2004 2,164 26,541 1,525   581 524 420   920 34,867 
2005 2,236 28,522 1,781   532 641 608   846 36,764 
2006 2,267 30,325 2,726   689 856 1,182 1,107 38,839 
2007 2,548 33,695 3,471 1,022 860 1,589 1,654 41,081 
2008 5,601 30,913 2,971 1,293 808 870 2,069 43,922 
2009 7,115 29,496 (2,509)   875 1,143 (4,528) 1,305 42,603 
2010 8,664 32,045 1,611   858 0 753 1,281 na 
Sources: Alaska Department of Revenue, Permanent Fund Corporation, US Department of Commerce.  All 
data is fiscal year except dividend amount and personal income. 
Notes: The CBR balance fluctuates due to loans to and repayments from the state general fund to finance 
ongoing government operations.  Permanent Fund earnings is the sum of interest, dividends, and realized 
capital gains.  Earnings fund the dividend and inflation proofing (put into the Permanent Fund).  There was no 
inflation proofing in 2010 because it was forward funded in 2009.  The residual, if positive, accumulates in a 
contingency fund (Earnings Reserve).  If negative, funds are drawn from the contingency fund to finance the 
dividend and inflation proofing.  The first dividend in 1982 was not paid from fund earnings.  The 2008 dividend 
included a special, one-time $1,200 appropriation from the state general fund to offset the high cost of fuel in 
Alaska caused by the rapid increase in the world oil price. 
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1 Royalties have accounted for 49 percent of total petroleum revenues.  Of the state taxes collected on petroleum 
activity-- production, income, and property—the production tax is the most important, having accounted for 37 
percent of total petroleum revenues.  The tax on income has accounted for 10 percent. 
 
2 This was in the form of a temporary reserves tax that was credited against future production taxes. 
 
3 The Alaska constitution prohibits dedicated funds, so an amendment was required to establish the Alaska 
Permanent Fund. 
 
4 Contributions from fields leased after 1979 are 50% of royalties, but these fields have been small relative to the early 
discoveries. 
 
5 The deposits from these sources are constitutionally protected from being spent, and are called the “fund corpus”.  
The market value of the fund at any time will be greater or less than this due to unrealized gains or losses on 
investments. 
 
6 The amount of the annual “inflation proofing” deposit is equal to the value of cumulative deposits at the end of 
the previous year multiplied by the percent change in the consumer price index over the current year.  This deposit 
is paid out of the realized earnings of the fund as an annual legislative appropriation. 
 
7 Neither the dividend nor the inflation proofing formulae depend on current year fund income.  
 
8 Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, 2007 Annual Financial Report, page 26. 
9 Under the “Percent of Market Value” (POMV) proposal, the fund would establish a target real rate of return and 
each year draw no more than that percent from the fund as income.  Implementation of this proposal would require 
a vote of the people to change the state constitution. 
 
10 See Peter J. Smith, ”The Politics of Plenty: Investing Natural Resource Revenues in Alberta and Alaska,” Canadian 
Public Policy, 17:2 1991, pages 139-154. 
 
11 See http://www.apfc.org/home. 
 
12 Interestingly, the state already had a cash distribution program when the dividend was proposed.  The Longevity 
Bonus Program, created shortly after statehood, provided a monthly cash payment of $100 to each person over 65 
who had lived in Alaska at least 25 years and was a resident at the time of statehood. The program was later 
expanded to include all persons over 65 regardless of length of residence, and has since been phased out. 
 
13  Because the dividend formula is based on the 5 year moving average of fund income, it is possible that current 
year income could be insufficient to fully fund a dividend payment.  It is for this reason that the fund maintains a 
contingency account which covers any shortfall in current year income.  This account is known as the “Earnings 
Reserve”. 
 
14 The first dividend of $1,000 was not paid out of Permanent Fund earnings. 
 
15 Since personal income, as defined by the US Dept of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, includes non wage 
earnings (benefits) and government medical payments not directly received by households, this probably 
somewhat underestimates the importance of the dividend as a share of income as perceived by many households. 
 
16 Gunnar Knapp et al.. “The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend Program: Economic Effects and Public Attitudes,” 
Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Alaska Anchorage, 1984. 
 
17 Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, Trustee Papers, 1989, page 63. 
 
18 This suggestion was advocated by the Alaska attorney Roger Cremo and was known as the Cremo Plan.  The 
Norwegian fund has adopted a version of this approach. 
 
19 Because the size of the dividend fluctuates, this estimate represents an average over time.  For a detailed 
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analysis. see Scott Goldsmith and Jeff Wanamaker, “The Economic Impact of the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend,” 
Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Alaska Anchorage, 1989. 
 
20 See Gordon Harrison, “The Economics and Politics of the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend Program,” in Alaska 
Public Policy Issues, ed. Clive Thomas (The Denali Press, 1999) Pages 81 to 91. 
 
21 But one study of the dividend concluded that consumption did not change at the time of the distribution.  See 
Chang-Tai Hsieh, “Do Consumers React to Anticipated Income Changes? Evidence from the Alaska Permanent 
Fund,” American Economic Review 93(1) March 2003, pages 397 to 405. 
 
22 Scott Goldsmith, “A Comparative Analysis of the Economic Effects of Re-imposing Personal Income Taxes, 
Reducing Permanent Fund Dividends, or Reducing State Spending,” Institute of Social and Economic Research, 
University of Alaska Anchorage, 1987. 
 
23 Between the early 1980s and the early 2000s, the after-tax income of the richest 20 percent of families increased 
at a faster rate than the poorest 20 percent in 38 states.  In 22 states the grow rates were about the same for the two 
groups.  Alaska was the only state in which the income of the bottom 20 percent grew at a faster rate (25%) than 
the income of the top 20 percent (10%).  In the early 1980’s Alaska had the greatest income inequality of any state, 
measured by the ratio of average income of the top 20 percent of families compared to the lowest 20 percent—6.6.  
By the early 2000s Alaska had fallen to 43rd place at 5.8 while the US average had increased from 5.5 to 7.3.  The 
trend toward greater income equality in Alaska was due both to faster growth in incomes of families at the bottom 
of the distribution—25% compared to 19% for the total US and to slower growth in incomes of families at the top of 
the distribution—10% compared to 59% for the total US.  See Jared Bernstein el al. “Pulling Apart: A State-by-State 
Analysis of Income Trends,” Center for Budget and Policy Priorities and Economic Policy Institute, Washington D.C., 
2006. 
 
24 These guidelines are used in the determination of eligibility for many, but not all, federal assistance programs.  The 
guidelines are higher for Alaska than other states because of the high cost of living, but they do not reflect 
differences in the cost of living across regions within the state. 
 
25 Scott Goldsmith et al. “The Status of Alaska Natives Report”. Prepared for the Alaska Federation of Natives, 
Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Alaska Anchorage, 2004.  The census poverty rate is based 
on the poverty threshold, a definition that varies with household composition, but does not account  for the higher 
cost of living in Alaska relative to other states.  As the relative cost of living has fallen in Alaska since statehood, one 
would expect the calculated poverty rate to increase if all other variables were held constant.  Thus the reported 
decline in the poverty rate over time is an underestimate of the actual trend in well being of the population. 
 
26 See Yereth Rosen, “In Alaska, a Push to Curb Perks for Citizens,” Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 2006. 
 
27 The case of “Papa Pilgrim” garnered considerable media attention early this decade after it was reported that he 
had moved to Alaska and settled in a remote location with his wife and 15 children.  It seemed clear to most 
Alaskans that his primary motive was to collect the dividend check and live off the land and state government 
services, since the family lived essentially cut off in the wilderness. 
 
28  One reviewer suggested  that this effect could be offset if the dividend led to an increase in the bargaining 
power of workers relative to employers. 
 
29 Non household taxes could not generate much revenue for several reasons.  First, only a small share of Alaska 
businesses are organized as corporations, so most are not liable for the corporate income tax.  A personal income 
tax would capture a share of the business profits of non corporate businesses.  Second, a large share of the 
economic base is federal government activities that are not taxable.  Finally, the non-wage gross product of the 
other resource industries—mining, seafood, and timber—is very small.  
 
30 The more the Permanent Fund comes to look like a trust fund for individuals, the more likely it is that the federal 
government would attempt to tax the fund income. 
